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Abstract. Many commonly used public key cryptosystems will become
insecure once a scalable quantum computer is built. New cryptographic
schemes that can guarantee protection against attacks with quantum
computers, so-called post-quantum algorithms, have emerged in recent
decades. One of the most promising candidates for a post-quantum sig-
nature scheme is SPHINCS+, which is based on cryptographic hash func-
tions. In this contribution, we analyze the use of the new Russian stan-
dardized hash function, known as Streebog, for the implementation of
the SPHINCS+ signature scheme. We provide a performance compari-
son with SHA-256-based instantiation and give benchmarks for various
sets of parameters.
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1 Introduction
Public key cryptography is a cornerstone of internet security. Quantum comput-
ers possess a threat on the widely deployed public-key cryptography schemes,
whose security is based on the computational complexity of certain tasks, such
as integer factorization and discrete logarithm. Shor’s quantum algorithm [1]
and variational quantum factoring [2] would allow one to solve these tasks with
a significant boost [3]. Quantum computers have less of an effect on symmet-
ric cryptography since Shor’s algorithm does not apply for their cryptoanalysis.
Nevertheless, Grover’s algorithm [4] would allow quantum computers a quadratic
speedup in brute force attacks. Thus, the current goal is to develop crypto-
graphic systems, that are secure against both classical and quantum attacks,
before large-scale quantum computers arrive.
Fortunately, not all public key cryptosystems are vulnerable to attacks with
quantum computers [5]. Several cryptosystems, that strive to remain secure un-
der the assumption that the attacker has a large-scale quantum computer, have
been suggested [6]. These schemes are in the scope of so-called post-quantum
cryptography. Existing proposals for post-quantum cryptography include code-
based and lattice-based schemes for encryption and digital signatures as well as
signature schemes based on hash-functions.
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Fig. 1. SPHINCS+ signatures scheme construction: Full scheme of the signatures con-
struction (left) and the dynamic representation (right).
Hash-based digital signatures are built upon cryptographic hash functions,
which are well-known tools in the modern cryptography. Such schemes attract
significant attention, since their security can be reduced to properties of the
chosen hashing primitive. Another benefit of hash-based signature schemes is
their flexibility as they can be used with any secure hashing function, and so if
a flaw is discovered in a secure hashing function, a hash-based signature scheme
just needs to switch to a new and secure hash function to remain effective.
The most advanced version of hash-based digital signatures is SPHINCS+ [7],
which is a modification of the previously suggested SPHINCS scheme employing
the Merkle hyper-tree [8]. Another option is the Gravity-SPHINCS scheme [8],
whose primary innovation is the authentication scheme update. Nevertheless,
SPHINCS+ requires less security assumptions.
Here we consider the use of the new Russian standardised hash function,
known as Streebog (GOST R 34.11-2012), for the implementation of the SPHINCS+
signature scheme. The Streebog hash function, described in RFC 6986 [9], is of
Merkle-Damgard-type function, which makes it suitable for the installation in
the SPHINCS+ scheme. We provide a performance comparison with SHA-256-
based instantiation and give benchmarks for various sets of parameters.
2 SPHINCS+ Instantiation with Streebog Hash Function
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the use of the Russian standardised
hash functions for the SPHINCS+ signature scheme. To this end, we start from
brief overview of SPHINCS+ and then demonstrate the results of its work with
the Russian standardised hash function Streebog, specified in GOST R 34.11-
2012 and described in RFC 6986 [9].
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Security level Private key size Public key size Signature size
SPHINCS+-128s 133 64 32 8 080
SPHINCS+-128f 128 64 32 16 976
SPHINCS+-192s 196 96 48 17 064
SPHINCS+-192f 194 96 48 35 664
SPHINCS+-256s 255 128 64 29 792
SPHINCS+-256f 254 128 64 49 216
Table 1. SPHINCS+ security level (in bits), private key, public key and signature sizes
(in bytes) for different specifications of the scheme [7].
2.1 SPHINCS+ signature scheme
The SPHINCS+ scheme uses a Merkle hyper-tree that consists of a large num-
ber of binary hash trees (see Figure 1). Each node in the binary hash tree is
associated with a hash string and has exactly two child nodes. The hash strings
are computed as a function of children’s strings. To build each subtree, several
public-private key-pairs of Winternitz-type one-time signatures (WOTS+) [10]
are generated. Compressed public keys are then used as subtree leafs, whereas
corresponding private keys sign roots of lower-level subtrees. On the lowest
level, Winternitz keypairs sign public keys of FORS (Forest of Random Subsets)
schemes. In their turn, FORS elements actually sign messages. For a given FORS
element, the signature security decreases with every signed message. However,
FORS elements in the hyper-tree are selected pseudorandomly, and probability
to select the same FORS element multiple times degrades much faster. For this
reason, there is no need to keep count of used FORS keys (“maintain the state”).
The hyper-tree part follows closely Extended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS),
which is a stateful signature scheme proposed for standardisation by IETF [11].
Typically, there are 10 to 20 layers of subtrees with height of each one about 3 to
8 depending on security level and other properties (see Table 1 for various sets
of parameters). The full hyper-tree is not held in memory rather the necessary
parts are generated dynamically when signing takes place.
A private key of the scheme consists of two seeds. The first one is used to
pseudorandomly generate FORS and Winternitz secret key elements, and the
other generates a randomization value for the message hashing. Public keys also
have two elements: The root of the hyper-tree and a public seed that is used in
various parts of the scheme. In practical implementations the secret key holds
copy of the public key elements.
To sign a message, a randomizer is generated and the message is hashed with
this randomizer. The output is split into message digest, and a part, determin-
ing subtree and leaf position of a FORS element to use. Message digest is signed
by the FORS scheme, and after that hyper-tree signature of the correspond-
ing FORS public key is computed. It consists of Winternitz one-time signatures
interleaved with Merkle authentication paths in subtrees. The full SPHINCS+
signature includes FORS and hyper-tree signatures. For the verification purpose,
FORS public key is reconstructed, then hyper-tree root is computed and com-
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Step Input SPHINCS+ designation
Generate pseudoran-
dom bytestring from
message
Secret seed SK.seed, optional
random value OptRand, mes-
sage M
PRF msg(SK.seed, OptRand, M)
Compute message di-
gest
Pseusorandom bytestring R,
public seed PK.seed, public
XMSS-MT root PK.root, mes-
sage M
H msg(R, PK.seed, PK.root, M)
Generate FORS se-
cret key elements
Secret seed SK.seed, element
address ADRS
PRF(SK.seed, ADRS)
FORS hash-tree con-
struction
Public seed PK.seed, address
of node to compute ADRS, hash
strings of two children nodes
M1, M2.
H(PK.seed, ADRS, M1, M2)
FORS tree roots com-
pression
Public seed PK.seed, address
in XMSSMT tree ADRS, k roots
of FORS trees roots[]
T len(PK.seed, ADRS, roots[])
Generate WOTS+ se-
cret key elements
Secret seed SK.seed, WOTS+
key element address ADRS
PRF(SK.seed, ADRS)
Iterate over hash
chains in WOTS+
Public seed PK.seed, chain ad-
dress of node to compute ADRS,
previous element in chain T
F(T, PK.seed, ADRS)
Compress WOTS+
public key elements
Public seed PK.seed, WOTS+
keypair address ADRS,
WOTS+ public key elements
pub[]
T len(PK.seed, ADRS, pub[])
Compute XMSS tree
on top of compressed
WOTS+ keys
Public seed PK.seed, address
of node to compute ADRS, hash
strings of two children nodes
M1, M2.
H(PK.seed, ADRS, M1, M2)
Table 2. Hash functions usage in SPHINCS+
SPHINCS+ designation SHA-256 Instantiation Streebog Instantiation
T len(PK.seed, ADRS, M1,
..., Mn)
SHA-256(PK.seed || ADRS
|| M+1 || ...|| M
+
n )
Streebog(PK.seed || ADRS
|| M+1 || ...|| M
+
n )
H(PK.seed, ADRS, M1 ,
M2)
SHA-256(PK.seed || ADRS
|| M+1 || M
+
2 )
Streebog(PK.seed || ADRS
|| M+1 || M
+
2 )
F(PK.seed, ADRS, M) SHA-256(PK.seed || ADRS
|| M+)
Streebog(PK.seed || ADRS
|| M+)
PRF(SEED, ADRS) SHA-256(SEED || ADRS) Streebog(SEED || ADRS)
PRF msg(SK.seed,
OptRand, M)
HMAC-SHA-256(SK.prf,
OptRand || M)
HMAC-Streebog(SK.prf,
OptRand || M)
H msg(R, PK.seed,
PK.root, M)
MGF1-SHA-256(SHA-256(R
|| PK.seed || PK.root ||
M), m)
MGF1-Streebog(Streebog(R
|| PK.seed || PK.root ||
M), m)
Table 3. SPHINCS+ primitives instantiation with SHA-256 and Streebog hash func-
tions.
SPHINCS+ digital signature scheme with Streebog hash function 5
pared to the published value. The SPHINCS+ security level (in bits), private
key, public key and signature sizes (in bytes) for different specifications of the
scheme are presented in Table 1 according to Ref. [7], even though the claimed
security levels might be overestimated [12].
The security of hash-based signature schemes can be reduced to underlying
hash function properties. The SPHINCS+ scheme can be built entirely from
standard hash functions. However, it uses several auxiliary functions to wrap
calls to them. They are summarized in Table 2.
2.2 SPHINCS+ with Streebog Hash Function
SPHINCS+ describes instantiations of auxiliary functions in terms of three hash
functions: SHAKE256, SHA-256, and Haraka. The Russian standardised hash
function Streebog is of Merkle-Damgard type, which makes it similar to SHA-
256. The compression function operates in the Miyaguchi–Preneel mode and
employs a 12-round AES-like cipher. Cryptoanalysis of Streebog hash function
was a subject of intensive research [13–15].
The necessary auxiliary functions and their instantiations in terms of SHA-
256 and Streebog functions are summarized in the Table 3. MGF1 is a hash-
based mask generation function [16] and HMAC is keyed-hashing for message
authentication [17] For SHA-256, we consider the function of the following form:
M+ = M ⊕MGF1− SHA-256(PK.seed||ADRS, len(M)).
For the Streebog instantiations, it changes as follows:
M+ = M ⊕MGF1− Streebog(PK.seed||ADRS, len(M)).
In the SPHINCS+ specification, three levels of security are considered. For each
level, two sets of parameters are provided: one is optimized for speed and the
other for signature size [7].
We provide the results of the comparison of the performance the SPHINCS+-
Streebog and SHA-256 instantiations for each set of parameters. For the compar-
ison purpose we employ realizations of the both hash functions from CryptoPro
CSP 4.0.9958 Zhegalkin version library [18]. All the tests were performed on
Xeon E5-2696v3 @ 2.3-3.8GHz processor with Linux 4.9 with the use of Google
Benchmark Framework [19]. The obtained results are illustrated in Figure 2.
One can see that for particular implementation of the hash functions, Stree-
bog achieves comparable performance, and thus is quite suitable for use in the
SPHINCS+ scheme.
3 Conclusion
We have analyzed how SPHINCS+ hash-based digital signature scheme can be
instantiated with hash function primitive Streebog, which is defined in GOST
Russian Federation state standard. SPHINCS+ scheme is provably secure, and
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Fig. 2. Performance comparison of the SPHINCS+-Streebog and SHA-256 instantia-
tions for different sets of parameters.
its security depends only on properties of the underlying hash function. The
Streebog hash function satisfies the demanded requirement for its use in the
SPHINCS+ digital signature scheme.
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